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Abstract
Cyber resilience is characterised by an ability to understand and adapt to changing network conditions,
including cyber attacks. Cyber resilience may be characterised by an effects-based approach to missions or
processes. One of the fundamental preconditions underpinning cyber resilience is an accurate representation of
current network and machine states and what missions they are supporting. This research outlines the need for
an ontological network representation, drawing on existing literature and implementations in the domain. This
work then introduces an open-source ontological representation for modelling cyber assets for the purposes of
Computer Network Defence. This representation encompasses computers, network connectivity, users, software,
vulnerabilities and exploits and aims for interoperability with related representations in common use. The utility
of this work is highlighted against a functional use-case depicting a realistic operational network and mission.
Finally, a future research direction is defined.
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INTRODUCTION
On the modern battlefield, the integrity of the cyber systems supporting operations is paramount. A commander
who requires precision fires to support mission objectives relies heavily on their networked Command, Control,
Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to deliver
these effects. Compromise of these systems by an opposing force will deny a commander unimpeded use of their
capabilities and lead to probable mission failure. Understanding the interrelation of these systems with the
physical and human systems of the battlespace is essential to developing an understanding of their potential
vulnerabilities and developing resilience strategies. The effect of a cyber attack is nuanced, and its impact on
assets and capabilities is often not immediately apparent against mission objectives. We seek to address these
challenges with this work.

BACKGROUND
The Australian Army's Future Land Warfare Report (MSP-A, 2014b) describes a future where militaries will
require that future conflict is “waged by information technology enabled forces in land, sea, air, space and
cyberspace" (MSP-A, 2014a, p8). Militaries will “use modern information technology to link sensors, weapons
systems, commanders and their personnel in a networked environment” (MSP-A, 2012, p60). Globally,
militaries are developing cyber doctrine (JSDO, 2013) scoping the offensive use of cyber capabilities -the
United States Army has even integrated proformas for Computer Network Attack and Cyber Effect requests, and
Cyberspace Operations Mission Task orders into doctrine (USA, 2013).
The new digital networked battlespace presents a paradox. To operate effectively in this future environment,
military forces are exploiting C4ISR networks to provide unprecedented levels of command and control
(Ormrod 2014a). A military force’s reliance on these systems to operate effectively can quickly become
dependence and bring vulnerability (Ormrod, 2014b). The British identify networked C2 as a key enabler of their
ability to effectively conduct manoeuvre warfare (DJFCD, 2012). The US Army also recognises this paradox
(DJFCD, 2012, p.v) and identify that their superior networked C2 capabilities are a likely target for enemy forces
seeking to disrupt their command and control and neutralise their technological advantage (USATDC, 2014).
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The significance of this exposure creates an imperative to investigate means to prevent cyber attacks from
occurring and plan for disaster recovery, preparing for the probability of operating in an information degraded
environment (Scott, 2013). Understanding these problems and preparing for their eventuality is working towards
creating organisational cyber resilience. Cyber resilience is premised on:
The current philosophy of trying to keep the adversaries out, or the assumption that they will be
detected if they get through the first line of defense, is no longer valid. Given the sophistication,
adaptiveness, and persistence of cyber threats, we can no longer assume that we can completely defend
against intruders and must change our mindset to assume some degree of adversary success and be
prepared to “fight through” cyber attacks to ensure mission success even in a degraded or contested
environment (Goldman, McQuaid, Piccotto, 2011, p1).
The United States Air Force extends this approach and actively advocates for the need to contextualise the
impact of cyber attack from a mission perspective, stating:
The time has come to think of cyberspace in a new light; not only must we defend against any attack,
we must be able to “fight through” any attack, accomplish our missions and retain the ability to
respond–thus giving us mission assurance in the face of future attacks or other disruptions (USAFSC,
2009, p4).
One of the first prerequisites of a “fight through [approach to cyber resilience is] ...to map USAF network to
USAF missions with end-to-end forensics approach” (USAFC, 2009, p11). Work related to these documents, if
any, is not in the public domain. Consequently, there is little research that adequately models the cyber domain
from a mission assurance and security impact perspective.
Planning For A Resilient Future
There are a near-infinite number of possible scenarios for which a resilient organisation must prepare. A futures
view of developing resilience requires decision makers to consider the possibilities, enumerate the plausibilities
and deduce the probable issues that they will encounter, enabling the decision maker to determine what actions
need to be taken to guide their organisation towards a preferable future state (Hajkowicz, 2015). Anticipating
problems and developing contingencies increases resilience.
Computer networks and cyberattacks interact with the battlefield and decision makers as a collection of
inextricably linked systems of systems. The complexity of the systems, issues of system to decision maker trust,
the inherent uncertainty of complex interactions and the resulting emergent phenomena intersect to form a
wicked problem for decision makers (Ormrod, 2014b), making the enumeration of futures extremely
challenging.
To understand the complexities of these systems, we must clearly identify the entities, properties and
relationships of the systems. To achieve this, we apply a network approach. Philosophically, networks are simply
a collection of concepts with defined interrelations. Complex systems are are collections of entities that interact fitting the network model. The benefit of applying a defined network structure to deconstruct complexity is that
it formalises the representation and enables analysts to validate the Emergent Phenomena of the network.
Emergent Phenomena are collective behaviours observed in network interactions. These phenomena offer the
best window of insight into possible futures. The generation of phenomena is highly dependent on the
underlying network structure (Caldarelli, Catanazro 2012). We have elected to use ontological structures to
reliably represent the complex systems of cyber-physical-cognitive interaction on the battlefield as networks.
An ontology is an explicit specification of a shared conceptualization (Gruber, 1995). It is a unifying framework
that unites multiple viewpoints facilitate problem solving (Uschold, Gruninger, 1996). A ‘strong’ ontology is
judged by its real-world semantics, use of logical axioms and machine readability (Obrst, 2010). They are built
by collecting and integrating numerous subject-predicate-object triples. Each triple should define a single fact
within the ontology. The effectiveness of this triple to represent only a single fact reflects the triple’s semantic
strength. In the context of the big data problems associated with modelling complex systems of systems a
semantically strong ontology will optimise searching, promote automation and efficiency of scale.
The Cyber Simulation Terrain (CST) proposed in this paper is the explicit definition of the concepts, properties
and relationships of the complex system that is organisational cyber-infrastructure. It is a component of the
Cyber Effects Simulation Ontology (CSEO) - an effort to model the effects that cyber attacks have on a
computer system as part of a larger, more complex interconnection of systems. The transparent semantic strength
of the CESO and CST will permit validation of observed emergent phenomena, enhancing the credibility of
simulations modelling the interactions of cyber effects on land forces in combat enabling future organisational
shaping towards resilience.
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RELATED WORK
Representation of computer networks to facilitate analysis of vulnerabilities, attack vectors and mission-node
criticality has a long history. Initially work was focused on graphing approaches to the problem (Phillips, Swiler
1998; Swiler, Phillips, Ellis 2001; Sheyner, et. al, 2002), utilising probabilistic statistical models to deduce
current and future states and attack paths. Limitations of scalability and fidelity contributed to supersession by
information fusion approaches. These approaches seek to efficiently exploit data collected by intrusion detection
sensors to generate probabilistic models of likely attack vectors and future network states. The INFERD (Sudit
et. al, 2006) and ECCARS (Sudit, Stotz, Holender, 2005) models were among the first major steps to achieving
an effective information fusion solution.
TANDI evolved from similar ideas, choosing to isolate the logical network topology from the predictive model
(Holsopple, Yang, Sudit, 2006). Independent topology or ‘terrain’ models are a core feature of many of the
subsequent information fusion approaches. VTAC (Argauer 2008), FuSIA (Holsopple, Yang, 2008), CAMUS
(Goodall, D’Amico, Kopylec, 2009) and the High-Level Information Fusion for Tracking and Projection of
Multistage Cyber Attacks (Yang et. al, 2009) all utilised independent terrain models.
Independent terrain models are also used in mission impact analysis as part of the CSIM (Jakobson, 2011a;
Jakobson 2011b; Jakobson 2013). They have been influential on the development of the Cyber-ARGUS
framework that models the command and control impacts of cyber attacks (Barreto 2012; Barreto 2014) and the
modelling of cyber situational awareness (Machado, Barreto, Yano, 2013; Machado, Yano 2014). It has
demonstrated utility in supporting cyber attack simulation, present in the CyberSim Modular Cyber Attack
Simulator (Moskal et. al, 2013), MASS (Moskal et. al, 2014) and CASCADES (Wheeler, 2014; Kreider, 2015).
All of these approaches have evolved out of the independent Cyber-Virtual Terrain model that was put forward
by Fava et. al (2007). Their paper applied an independent terrain model to complex multistage cyber attacks. The
catalyst for the development of independent terrain models, however, is the Virtual Terrain (VT) model
(Holsopple et. al, 2008). The VT model encapsulates the Cyber Virtual Terrain and defines the core elements of
terrain models that endure across its evolutions.
The VT core evolved in the Virtual Terrain version 2 (VT.2) to include the capacity to represent incomplete
network information, include a more accurate depiction of internet connectivity and represent routers exclusively
as traversal nodes. (Moskal et. al, 2013; Moskal et. al, 2014). The most recent iteration of the VT is the Dynamic
Virtual Terrain (DVT) (Wheeler, 2014). Like VT.2, the DVT is intended to support cyber-attack simulations.
The DVT is a significant revision of the VT and VT.2. Its key aim is to facilitate the simulation of Moving
Target Network Defence Measures (MTNDM) such as IP address hopping and port hopping. The Cyber Terrain
(CT) developed by Jakobson in 2011 (Jakobson 2011a; 2011b) has evolved from the original VT to support
mission planning and resilience building.
Each of these terrains was assessed for their suitability for inclusion into the CESO. However, lack of publicly
available schema has prevented a detailed suitability analysis. Based on the publicly available information, a
consistent issue is a lack of granularity. CVT, VT, VT.2 and DVT simplify representation at the cost of fidelity.
The mapping of nodal interdependencies by the VT family of models is not sufficient to realistically represent
the network. CT maps the dependencies in a granular manner but then abstracts much of the nodal detail that
makes the VT family of models useful. DVT has stepped further away from reality, centralising many functions
of the network - modifying and abstracting the terrain structure to represent MTNDMs. Existing terrain models
also do not address the actual flow of information across the network, sessional communication between nodes,
wireless as its own use-case, data spill or virtualisation.
The CST adopts the CT approach to dependency mapping with the philosophy of the VT family of terrains gearing towards the simulation of cyber attacks. It will do this at greater levels of granularity and maximise
interoperability with linked efforts such as the MITRE standards and the Structured Threat Information
eXpression (STIX) (Barnum, 2012). The semantic strength of this ontological structure will enable validation of
results generated by simulations and analysis, maximising the efficacy of the predicted future states it represents.

THE CYBER SIMULATION TERRAIN
The purpose of the CST is to accurately model the assets and systems across a computer network. The
representation must be generic enough to encompass corporate networks also extensible enough to model
bespoke and operational systems. Modelling a computer network has several benefits; a comparison between
network sensors and predefined models allow for rogue and masquerading device detection, an understanding of
impact from hypothetical scenarios across realistic infrastructure, allows for a greater and immediate
understanding of the impact of a cyber-security incident, and to understand the impact of a cyber-security
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incident on business processes or missions. Finally, a detailed computer and network model can be used for
research-based simulation.
Although government publicly advocates endpoint protection (Australian Signals Directorate, 2012) and there
are multiple commercial implementations (FireEye; CYLANCE; Bromium; SentinelOne; Bit9; EMC 2015),
most of the benefits of these tools relate to blocking infection, reporting endpoint state and patch status, and
remote forensic acquisition. There is little work on modelling the network state and shape over time against
known states. Changes to the expected behaviour of objects or network shape, caused by misconfiguration,
device masquerading or rogue devices, can be easily detected through comparisons to models representing the
predefined ‘normal’ network.
A comprehensive cyber security model can also be used to test hypotheses against a network for impact analysis.
An example of this was the announcement of the OpenSSL Heartbleed vulnerability (Codenomicon, 2015).
Immediately after its publication and public disclosure, there was little understanding of the impact of the
exploitable vulnerability across the network. In some cases, it took several days for providers to fully appreciate
the effects to internal systems, operations and data. A network model allows for new vulnerabilities and exploits
to be tested against a particular network system to determine immediate impacts and ongoing leverage points.
These can be injected into the model and their impact tested without endangering an operational environment.
The CST is designed to accomplish these aims.
The CST Schema is open source and available at:
https://github.com/AustralianCentreforCyberSecurity/Cyber-Simulation-Terrain
Public availability makes the ontology unique in that it is available for critique and analysis. The repository also
contains several use-cases that highlight its intended use. The schema has been implemented using the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) (RDF Working Group, 2014a) Turtle (TTL) (RDF Working Group 2014b) syntax
with minimal elements of the Ontology Web Language (OWL) (OWL Working Group, 2012). Queries are
performed using the Sparql Protocol And Rdf Query Language (SPARQL) (SPARQL Working Group, 2015).
The CST Schema has been designed to achieve granularity in content and structure in representation. Figure 1
depicts the schema. The blue nodes represent the concepts or objects in the ontology. The red represent
properties (will be leaf nodes) and relationships (will be traversal nodes). The visualisations in this paper were
created using the easyRDF converter (Humfrey, 2015) and the RDFGravity Visualisation Tool (Goyal,
Westenhaler, 2015).
Schema
The CST is an interconnection of nodes. Nodes can be specialised as computers, routers, IDS sensors or Domain
Controllers. Nodes connect to Subnetworks through a Network Interface Controller (NIC) (including wireless
and virtual nodes). Computer MAC and IP addresses are associated with their NIC, permitting the representation
of a computer belonging to multiple physical, virtual and wireless networks via multiple interfaces. Subnetworks
connect to each other and the internet through a router. A router will have defined routes that control the traffic
flow across the network between subnets. The internetwork is the network of routers - a conceptual addition that
assists in modelling the interconnection of subnets.
Computers will have associated software and services. These concepts are arranged hierarchically in a similar
manner to the Virtual Terrain service tree concept. Computers are associated with an installed version of
software. That installed version will be associated with a parent software type class to facilitate categorisation
and querying. The more granular relationships are to the service that software projects when running on the
computer and any known vulnerabilities associated with a piece of software. Zero-days are represented as an
exploit related to a vulnerability, but will have no links to a CVE or other published vulnerability. Software
versions are associated with their CPE ID (MITRE, 2015a), vulnerabilities with their CVE identifier (Martin,
2001) and weakness types are associated with a CWE (MITRE 2015b) number. Metrics of criticality and
exploitability associated with vulnerabilities utilise the CVSS (FIRST CVSS SIG, 2015) scores. The intention of
integration with these standards is to leverage the existing resources, maximise the interoperability of the CST
with the wider CESO as one of the modules. The vulnerability association is also the interface with the ‘red
team’ elements of the CESO, an abridged implementation of STIX, also aims to leverage existing work and
maximising interoperability.
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Figure 1 - CST Schema
Installed software runs either local or remote services. Local services run internally to the node, and remote
services project their Service Name, Port Number and Protocol to the NIC connected to their computer forming
an implicit host-based firewall - if a service has a port open on the network card, it is assumed to be listening. If
it is not listening it will not be shown. Services also have an associated privilege level. These privilege levels
map to the privilege levels associated with users. If a user has a privilege level that matches the service, they can
interact with it. Users can be associated with a computer either locally or as part of a domain. Local users can
access only a computer with which they have an explicit link. Domain users belong to a domain that can have
multiple member computers. Domain users can access any computer in a domain to which they are
authenticated. Domains have a domain controller that connects to a single subnet but can control domains across
multiple subnets. There can be multiple domains per subnet and multiple domains per computer, allowing us to
represent a user who might have a secret and an unclassified domain account on the same computer and
accounting for data-spill use-cases. Users are owners of their data. Data is stored locally on computers on a disk.
The disks can be encrypted or unencrypted. If encrypted, a user has to authenticate to access the data.
Intrusion detection and antivirus is implemented at the host level. A host-based signature IDS is represented as a
running service on a node. The IDS links to a signature database that will consist of the unique identifiers
matching vulnerabilities and exploits. The IDS has configurable rules that are a subtype of the software
configuration concept linked to the installed version of the software. These rules allow the IDS to be ‘tuned’ by
selecting the signature and action on detection. MTNDMs can be represented in the CST by its linkage to the
CESO Event Ontology.
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EXAMPLE USE CASE
The use-case implemented below is drawn from the paper defining the CESO (Ormrod, Turnbull, O’Sullivan,
In-Press). It depicts the process required for a Joint Fires Team (JFT) to call for Offensive Support (OS), the call
for fire to be handled by a Joint Fires Communication Centre (JFCC) and have the mission fired by an Artillery
Battery. Figure 2 visualises the required cyber infrastructure to conduct this task. It does not demonstrate the full
capabilities of the terrain but is a proof-of-concept of the most commonly used features.
The use-case depicts three subnetworks connected by routes on the same router - the JFT Network, the JFCC
Network and the Artillery Battery Network. All computers on these networks are members of the ‘Joint Fires’
Domain and are accessible by all authenticated users. Computers are running a mix of local and remote software
and services (services are fabricated for this use-case). The JFT has Targeting and Request for Fires
Communications software. They use this to communicate with the JFCC, who use their Mission Control software
to push the fire mission to the Artillery Battery HQ. The communications between the JFCC and the Artillery
Battery HQ are encrypted. However, the software that they are using is an older version of OpenSSL that is still
vulnerable to Heartbleed. The Battery HQ uses their Battery Management Software to push the fire missions to
individual Artillery Troops who use their Fire Control Software to prosecute the fire mission.

Figure 2 - CST Call for Fire use-case visualisation
In addition to effectively representing this use-case, the CST can also elicit information about the network.
Figure 3 shows the results of queries run against the use-case. The first query can quickly produce information
about computer and network attributes. The second query checks for the presence of known vulnerabilities,
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detecting Heartbleed on the JFCC and Battery HQ computers. Query three then returns all known information
about the vulnerability.
These are only a small subset of the queries that the CST uses to determine possible, plausible and probable
futures. The emergent phenomena(potential future state) in this use-case is the potential relationship that an actor
attacking the network has with the Heartbleed vulnerability. The attacker could compromise the confidentiality
of that link, use it to intercept communications and learn of the impending fire mission, and warn the targets of
the fire mission, potentially giving the enemy time to evade or prepare counter-battery fire in response to the
attack. These fascinating and relevant second and third order effects are not knowable from looking at
information in isolation. A decision maker who learns that a probable future has their OS capability rendered
ineffective by an enemy at a time of their choosing will likely wish to take actions (such as patching the
vulnerability) to move towards a preferable future where their OS capability remains effective.

Figure 3 - CST Use-case - SPARQL Query Results

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we have outlined the requirement and initial implementation of a publicly-available ontological
schema designed to assist in Cyber Security Research. There are several areas of future work arising from this;
the highest priority of these being the continual improvement and refinement of the ontological schema. Beyond
this, it is expected that the ontology will evolve over time as new concepts arise, new network designs emerge,
and additional information is required. Some of these changes will be minor, and some may require backwardsincompatible changes. As these occur testing, harnesses and deployments will be updated.
The biggest area of future work is in the development of systems to populate, reason on and visualise this
ontology. There are also multiple defined use-cases that require further development. There are precedents for
the automated detection and ingestion of data sources and several associated challenges (Moir, Dean, 2015;
Grove et. al, 2013) that will guide these efforts. The first stage of development will be to support automated
simulation development and analysis.
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